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Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute 
for Innovation and Competition 
of 26 April 2017 
 
on the European Commission’s 
 
“Public consultation on Building the European Data Economy” 
 
 
Josef Drexl*, Reto M. Hilty*, Jure Globocnik**, Franziska Greiner**, Daria Kim**, 
Heiko Richter**, Peter R. Slowinski**, Gintarė Surblytė***, Axel Walz***, 
Klaus Wiedemann** 
 
 
 
The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition is a research institute 
within the Max Planck Society that since its founding 51 years ago has been 
committed to the analysis and development of intellectual property and competition 
law on the basis of established scientific principles. The Max Planck Institute 
undertakes research on fundamental questions of law in these areas. Through its 
wide range of contributions to research, it has initiated and provided guidance for 
important legislation at the national, European and international level. The Institute 
regularly advises governmental bodies and other organisations. It takes an 
international approach and places emphasis on the comparative analysis of law as 
well as economic and technological aspects of legal development. 
 
Based on its Communication of 10 January 2017,1 the European Commission has 
launched a public consultation in which the Max Planck Institute takes part by 
answering several questions contained in the online consultation form. This Position 
Statement is annexed to the Institute’s responses to the online consultation. It 
provides a more comprehensive picture of the Institute’s assessment of the 
Communication and discusses core issues that particularly relate to Chapter 3 of the 
Communication on ‘data access and transfer’ including issues of ownership in data 
                                                 
* Prof. Dr., Director. 
** Doctoral Student supported by the MPI/Junior Research Fellow at the MPI. 
*** Dr., Senior Research Fellow at the MPI. 
1 Communication from the Commission – ‘Building a European Data Economy’, COM(2017) 9 
final. 
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and access to data. This Position Statement also takes into account the debate on 
further developing the concept of data portability, which is addressed in Chapter 5 
of the Communication. In presenting this Position Statement, the Institute also 
builds on its early Position Statement of 16 August 2016 on ‘Data Ownership and 
Access to Data’.2 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
1  The Institute welcomes and supports the initiative of the European 
Commission and its policy goal of enhancing access to data as a measure to 
build a European data economy in the process of the current digital transition 
of industrial production. The Institute shares the Commission’s understanding 
that the goal should be to promote innovation and ultimately economic growth 
and social welfare by enhancing new business models that build on a new 
generation of machines, tools and devices in which sensors are embedded as 
well as new business models for the exploitation of the data that are collected 
through such sensors by relying on big-data analyses in particular. 
 
2 The Institute is also of the opinion that access to data will be key for the 
building of the European data economy. Data access is not only important for 
other business operators, but also for public sector bodies acting in the public 
interest, including public health, protection of the environment, control of 
energy consumption, infrastructure and urban planning.3 
 
3  In the introduction to its Communication the Commission quite rightly points 
out that data is not only used as a component of new and innovative services 
and to improve goods or production, but also for improving decision-making. 
Indeed, improving decision-making can even be considered as the 
overarching paradigm for describing the advantages that derive from any 
processing of data in this new economy, whether it happens within a machine 
or a technological environment or by producing new knowledge and insights 
of human beings through data analytics which will then enable the 
government and business operators to make better decisions. In the field of 
autonomous driving, decisions will be made by the connected car itself, 
whereby modern algorithms based on deep learning will constantly improve 
and enhance the quality of those decisions based on the data they collect from 
                                                 
2 Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Position Statement on Data Ownership and 
Access to Data, available at: 
http://www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/content/stellungnahmen/positionspaper-data-eng-
2016_08_16-def.pdf = https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833165. 
3 The societal benefits of the data economy are broadly discussed, with an emphasis on the interest in 
access of the state to data, in the study of the OECD, Data-Driven Innovation: Big Data for Growth 
and Well-Being (2015), available at: http://www.oecd.org/sti/data-driven-innovation-
9789264229358-en.htm (accessed 20 April 2017).  
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the sensors embedded in the car and additional information the car receives 
through the Internet of Things (IoT).  
 
4  The overarching goal of improving decision-making deserves to be pointed 
out, since ‘improving decisions’ is not a public interest in itself. The societal 
and economic effects completely depend on the goals that are pursued by the 
decision-maker, or – as will now often be the case – by the machine that will 
increasingly assist human beings in making decisions as an expression of 
artificial intelligence. This shows that the ‘free flow of data’ should not 
always be promoted. This is especially the case where decision-making by 
firms can harm competition. A critical discussion on the cartel-like effects of 
big-data applications that result from automated and targeted pricing based on 
data analyses and algorithms is just about to emerge4 and may need to be 
taken into account more critically in the future.  
 
5  Further limitations to the ‘free-flow-of-data’ principle may become necessary 
insofar as the protection of fundamental rights will be affected by automated 
decision-making processes. Fundamental rights, such as the protection of 
human dignity and personality rights, including in particular the right to data 
protection, need to be carefully considered and a high level of protection 
needs to be maintained. The Institute believes that in this regard a separate in-
depth discussion of legal as well as ethical principles is of fundamental 
importance. The Max Planck Institute therefore welcomes the corresponding 
discussion initiated by the European Parliament.5  
 
6  As regards its Communication of 10 January 2017, the Commission should 
however not be accused of neglecting the potential negative effects of making 
use of data. In Chapter 2 of the Communication, where the Commission 
conceives the free flow of data as almost a new fundamental freedom, it also 
confirms that there are public-interest grounds that can justify restrictions, not 
least among them legitimate privacy concerns. Moreover, the Commission 
                                                 
4 See also the recent speech by Competition Commissioner Vestager, Algorithms and Competition, 
Bundeskartellamt 18th Competition Conference, Berlin, 16 March 2017, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/vestager/announcements/bundeskartellamt-18th-conference-competition-berlin-16-march-
2017_en (accessed 20 April 2017); see also Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice Stucke, Virtual Competition - 
The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy (2016).  
5 See the recent study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee to 
evaluate and analyse, from a legal and ethical perspective, a number of future European civil law 
rules in robotics, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571379/IPOL_STU(2016)571379_EN.p
df (accessed on 20 April 2017). This study refers to the European Parliament’s Draft Report of 31 
May 2016, 2015/2103(INL), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML%2BCOMPARL%2BPE-582.443%2B01%2BDOC%2BPDF%2BV0//EN 
(accessed on 20 April 2017). The need for careful, thorough and in depth analyses becomes (not 
only) obvious when the European Parliament, in rec. 31 lit. f) of its Draft Report, raises the critical 
and difficult question of whether a specific legal status should be created for robotic systems. 
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moves a considerable step forward in its recent Communication by now 
taking into account the interface between new data-based business models and 
data protection, while in the earlier Communication of 6 May 2015 on the 
Digital Single Market Strategy, the free-flow-of-data initiative was 
deliberately limited to non-personal data.6 This limitation was important at the 
preparatory stage in order to clearly separate the different barriers to the flow 
of data. But the Institute welcomes the fact that the Commission is now 
widening the perspective. The free-flow-of-data initiative is not only about 
firms that produce intelligent machines and robots that operate in the factories 
of industrial customers. It also regards pharmaceutical companies that monitor 
the body functions of patients during the course of medication and the 
manufacturers of household devices that may also collect data about the living 
habits of individuals. In building up their business models, especially firms 
offering sensor-equipped products to end-consumers necessarily have to take 
into account data protection rules.  
 
7  By far, the Communication does not appear to address all issues relevant for 
the development of the European data economy, yet it is very ambitious. By 
not specifically taking into account the potentially negative effects of access, 
the Commission concentrates its undertaking on identifying the impediments 
to the free flow of data in the market for the purpose of preparing future ac-
tions to overcome such impediments. This is a valid approach by itself. To the 
extent that the Institute hereby comments on the Communication, it seeks to 
contribute to a future regulatory framework for the European data economy 
by looking at both ownership and access. In the following, both aspects of 
ownership and access regimes will be discussed in more detail. 
 
 
II.  Data ownership and potential legislation on a data producer’s right  
 
8  Prior to the publication of the Communication a most intensive academic, 
political and even public debate emerged on whether data ownership should 
be recognised and who the owner should be. The discussion was even inspired 
by the Commission itself in its 2015 Communication on the Digital Single 
Market Strategy. The Institute particularly welcomes the Commission’s 
decision to discuss a potential ‘data producer’s right’ only as part of a legal 
framework for data access. This distinguishes the Commission’s proposal 
from other more recent academic proposals on a data producer’s right that 
advocate a proprietary right that seeks economic participation of the data 
producer in the income generated from the commercialization of data in 
                                                 
6 See Communication from the Commission – A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, p. 15, 
COM(2015) 192 final. 
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downstream markets.7 While such proposals are influenced by considerations 
of distributive justice – especially when it comes to deciding on who should 
be recognised as the data-producer –, by deductions based on already existing 
rights, such as the right in personal data, and by dogmatic arguments, the 
Commission is taking a functional approach that relies on economic 
arguments. This coincides with the position of the Institute according to 
which any recognition of a new intellectual property right as a particular form 
of regulation of the market is in need of an economic justification.8 Rather 
than on arguments of distributive justice, such justification has to rely on a 
sound understanding of identifiable market failures. A new property rights 
system should only be introduced if such a right will improve the functioning 
of the data economy. This need for an economic justification also has to guide 
the design of any new property right regime, including the protected subject-
matter, the right-holder and the scope of protection. Hence, the question to be 
answered is whether it is possible to identify a market failure in the form of 
insufficient access to data that requires the introduction of a data producer’s 
right as considered by the Commission.  
 
9  More specifically, the Communication considers the possibility of legislation 
on a data producer’s right as a right of the ‘owner or the long-term user’ of a 
sensor-equipped device. The idea is that such a right would give more choice 
to the data producer and thereby help the data producer to use the data and to 
‘unlock’ machine-generated data held by the manufacturers. This implies that 
there are cases where the owner or user has a legitimate interest in access to 
the data, whereas the manufacturer having de facto control over the data 
would not be willing to grant such access.  
 
10  The Institute agrees that such situations could indeed be imagined. One 
hypothetical scenario regards maintenance cases. Sensors are often embedded 
in modern devices to enable predictive maintenance. Indeed, manufacturers 
also have an interest in providing repair and maintenance services. If the user 
of the device wants to switch to an independent supplier of repair and 
maintenance services, this will not be possible if the information controlled by 
the manufacturer is not made available to the competitor. Another example 
regards cases where users use multiple devices equipped with sensors that are 
supplied by different manufacturers. In such cases, there is an obvious interest 
of the user to have access to the datasets of the different manufacturers. For 
instance, the owner of a factory needs access to the data collected by all the 
                                                 
7 See, in particular, the proposal by Karl-Heinz Fezer, ‘Dateneigentum – Theorie des 
immaterialgüterrechtlichen Eigentums an verhaltensgenerierten Personendaten der Nutzer als 
Datenproduzenten’, (2017) MultiMedia und Recht 1. 
8 See also the Institute’s Position Statement of 16 August 2016 (Fn. 2), para. 5-8. See also Josef 
Drexl, ‘Designing Competitive Markets for Industrial Data – Between Propertization and Access’ 
(2016), p. 30-38, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2862975 
(accessed 20 April 2017). 
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machines used in the factory in order to employ a comprehensive data-based 
factory management system. The same is true of the operator of any building, 
such as an administrative building or a hotel, who is in need of access to the 
data collected by all the grid operators for the supply of water, electricity, 
energy and ITC services, as well as the suppliers of smart devices, for 
operating a smart facility management system for that building. Furthermore, 
there is the example of a farmer who uses the machines of different 
manufacturers but wants to operate a system for ‘smart farming’ based on the 
service of an external service provider. In some of these cases the 
manufacturer of the devices will be willing to grant access. However, 
manufacturers could also refuse to grant access to the data to force customers 
to buy their products only. Hence, in all of these cases, promoting access to 
the data in the interest of the user can be justified by competition policy 
concerns. It will be seen whether the Commission’s consultation will produce 
better evidence for the existence of such problems and the practical need for 
intervention in such cases. 
 
11  If one assumes that there is such a market failure that requires legislative 
action, the question remains whether the data producer’s right is the right 
approach to tackle the problem. Indeed, against the backdrop of the questions 
asked in the online consultation, the data producer’s right seems to be only 
one option, and indeed one that is situated at the very interventionist end of 
the scale. Hence, it is important to also look at other alternative approaches. 
The following options are indicated in the consultation: (a) let the parties 
decide who should have the right to license the re-use of the data (at para. 13 
below); (b) introduce non-mandatory contract rules that can be combined with 
the application of rules on the control of unfair contract terms in B2B 
relations (at para. 14 below); (c) both parties share the right to license the re-
use of the data (at para. 15 below); (d) the manufacturer is vested with the 
exclusive right to license the re-use of the data (at para. 16 below); and (e) the 
user will be vested with the exclusive right to license the re-use of the data 
(‘data producer’s right’) (at paras 17-19 below). 
 
12  The Commission is addressing these options in a rather neutral manner, 
namely, with regard to a potential positive effect on the availability of 
machine-generated data for the purpose of re-use. This is important to note, 
since it is also clear that a decision on the attribution of a property right to the 
user of the device could also have negative effects on access to data when 
third parties seek direct access to the larger and more diverse datasets held by 
the manufacturer.  
 
13 The option to leave the allocation of the right to license the re-use of the data 
to the parties based on the principle of freedom of contract will most likely 
lead to an agreement whereby the manufacturer will retain that right. The 
manufacturer typically exercises de facto control over the data. Such de facto 
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control based on technological protection measures already enables 
manufacturers to commercialise the data since third parties will otherwise not 
be able to access this data. This explains why firms today can already engage 
in ‘trading’ and ‘sharing’ data based on contract law without legal recognition 
of data ownership. Factual control creates factual exclusivity as the basis for 
effective bargaining and pricing. In contrast, the user of the device will hardly 
be able to claim full control over the licensing of the re-use of the data, since 
it will be the manufacturer who will typically use standard contract terms 
formulated in its own interest. Even in cases as described above where the 
user has a clear interest in access to the data, a manufacturer who strives to 
reserve a larger portion of the business for itself will be very reluctant to grant 
a contractual access right to the user. 
 
14  But non-mandatory contract rules coupled with the application of rules on the 
control of unfair contract terms could in fact provide some help. In particular, 
such contract rules could specifically be limited to cases as described above 
where there is an identifiable interest of the user in gaining access. However, 
there are also particular shortcomings to that approach. Such rules may be 
quite difficult to enforce, especially if they rely on the rather diffuse standard 
of fairness. More importantly, the scope of application would be too limited. 
Such rules would only protect the direct purchaser who has entered into a 
contract with the manufacturer. But the direct purchaser and owner of the 
device can also immediately lease the device to an end-user who is not a party 
to the contract with the manufacturer.9 Similarly, small entrepreneurs often do 
not buy devices, but corresponding services. For example, small farmers often 
refrain from buying all machines themselves for economic reasons and 
instead ‘buy’ farming services from the operators/owners of farming 
machines that work on the fields of many farmers. Yet it is the individual 
farmer who is in need of access to the data without being the owner or even 
the user of the device. Moreover, the original purchaser may sell the device 
after a certain period of use. Under the principle of privity of contract, the 
contractual right of access to the data will not travel with the property in the 
used device. 
 
15 Most problematic is the idea of recognising the manufacturer and the user of 
the device as co-owners of the data. There is only one argument that seems to 
support this solution. If one asks who is ‘producing the data’, on a purely 
factual basis, the argument could be advanced that both parties should be 
considered co-producers. First, the input of the manufacturer is essential. It is 
in fact the manufacturer who has developed the product and the underlying 
business model and fully controls the technical process of ‘producing’ the 
data. But the specific data will not be produced without use of the device; and 
the kind of data produced depends on who uses the device and how it is used. 
                                                 
9 This case is explicitly stated in the Communication (n. 1), p. 13. 
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Yet the obvious problem is that co-ownership would lead to a blocking 
situation if only one of the co-owners is willing to license, and the applicable 
national law on ownership requires joint administration. In particular co-
ownership will prevent access where the user wants to provide a third party 
with access to the data to enable a service for the user against the interests of 
the manufacturer. The applicable national law could only provide some 
leeway by providing for a duty to cooperate by not unduly refusing consent to 
the licensing of the re-use. However, such a duty would also need to be 
enforced before the courts in case of conflict. 
 
16 The investment made by the manufacturer in the development of the product 
and the innovative business model could argue in favour of vesting an 
exclusive right to license in the manufacturer. This would also have 
advantages for many re-users, since they would get access to the whole 
dataset of the manufacturer collected from all the devices the manufacturer 
has put on the market. However, investment by itself does not justify a new IP 
right. Any new IP right would be in need of being justified by an identifiable 
market failure to which it responds. Yet the manufacturer is not in need of a 
property right. As shown above (at para. 13), it can in any case assert the right 
to license the re-use of the data based on its de facto control over the data.  
 
17  Yet, without further legislation, the problem remains that exclusive control of 
the manufacturer over the data will not help the user of the device in cases 
where this user has a vital interest in access to the data. This leaves us with 
the question whether an exclusive right of the user as the ‘data producer’ 
should be recognised. However, this proposal also has to be rejected. Such a 
right would not go far enough, since it does not really solve the underlying 
market failure problem (at para. 18 below), and, at the same time, it would go 
too far by creating additional access problems (at para 19 below).  
 
18  The underlying problem is one of unequal bargaining power and the particular 
market power of the manufacturer. But recognition of an exclusive right as 
such cannot be considered a means to overcome superior market power.10 The 
exclusive property right vests the rightholder with full autonomy to license the 
right, even on a royalty-free basis. Since in the abovementioned situations the 
interest of the manufacturer consists in barring the rightholder from access, it 
will include a clause in its contract that compels the purchaser/user to grant an 
exclusive and royalty-free licence to the manufacturer. As regards users that 
are not directly legally bound by a contract with the manufacturer, the 
manufacturer could achieve the same result by obliging its direct customers to 
provide in their contracts with the users for the grant of an exclusive third-
party licence to the manufacturer for the use of the data.  
                                                 
10 This argument is also made by Wolfgang Kerber, ‘A New (Intellectual) Property Right for Non-
Personal Data? An Economic Analysis’ (2016) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 
Internationaler Teil 989, 996. 
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19  At the same time such exclusive ownership right would run the risk of 
restricting the abilities of the manufacturer to license the datasets under its 
control to third parties. Many third parties will not want to contract with the 
many individual users as rightholders if they seek, or even depend upon, 
access to the larger datasets controlled by the manufacturer. Hence, if a data 
producer’s right was introduced for the user of the device, a manufacturer 
would have to do everything in its power to obtain exclusive licences for the 
use of the data from all the users. Since such licences are clearly needed to 
create downstream data markets for the more comprehensive datasets held by 
the manufacturer, the law should not prevent the manufacturer from asserting 
such a right to license to third parties in its contracts with the users. 
 
 
III.  A data access right as a potential alternative to the data producer’s right 
 
20  Rather than establishing a new property rights system, the better solution 
would therefore consist in recognising a targeted and non-waivable data 
access right. The legislature is at best confronted with an access problem. 
Hence, it should also limit any future legislation to solving this problem. 
Accordingly, the Institute recommends that the Commission consider 
legislation on such a data access right as a possible alternative approach to a 
data producer’s right.  
 
21  This approach has several advantages. First, as a statutory non-waivable right 
it can also be vested in a person who is not the purchaser of the device. 
Indeed, the entitled person should be the one who has a legitimate interest in 
access to the data. This is not even necessarily the ‘user of the device’, as 
becomes apparent in the case of the farmer whose land is worked by a third-
party service provider. The relevant interest arises from the need of a person, 
such as the farmer, for additional services linked to that data. In the light of 
this interest, it is not relevant who bought, who owns or who uses the device. 
It seems more appropriate to vest the right of data access in the beneficiary of 
the use of the device. Second, the interest in access also defines the scope of 
protection. The right of access should be limited to the purpose of conducting 
data analysis in the interest of the entitled person, irrespective of whether this 
analysis is organised within the company of the entitled person or whether 
this analysis is out-sourced to an independent data analysis service provider. 
In the latter case the data access right should include the right to request the 
manufacturer to grant access to the independent service provider.  
 
21  Furthermore, it is to be noted that these limitations of the data access right can 
be regulated in a positive way, meaning that they can be formulated as 
requirements for the grant of the right in a way that builds on the specific 
interest in access. In terms of legal technique, this is a clear advantage. When 
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the Commission discusses the ‘data producer’s right’ of the user of the device 
it understands that the recognition of such right may go too far and thus 
require specific exceptions and limitations. Technically speaking, an 
exclusive data producer’s right would first be defined as a right in rem as 
regards general use of the data without any regard to the underlying market 
failure. Then, the legislature would have to cut back excessive protection by 
formulating exceptions and limitations. This, however, is enormously difficult 
to implement, since the legislature would have to cover all those cases in a 
negative way where there is no justification for protection. A data access 
right, on the other hand, would avoid excessive protection up front by directly 
targeting the market failures it is supposed to respond to. 
 
23 However, there are several sub-issues of the data access right that will need 
further consideration and discussion. In particular, it is not clear whether the 
data access right should be implemented as a general access regime applicable 
to all sectors or whether a more sector-specific approach should be preferred. 
Indeed, it should be noted that the European legislature has already adopted 
sector-specific access regimes that build on a very different form of regulatory 
model as regards data access in favour of independent providers of motor 
vehicle maintenance and repair services.11 In the motor vehicle sector, this 
may be the more effective, and for consumers more convenient, approach to 
regulation of access to the data held by the manufacturer. This example shows 
that more information about the use cases will be needed prior to the adoption 
of general legislation. Ultimately, the most appropriate approach could consist 
in the adoption of general legislation on an access right for the beneficiary of 
the use of a sensor-equipped device without prejudice to the application of 
sector-specific regulation. 
 
24  Another issue for further consideration and discussion concerns the question 
of whether access should be free of charge or not. In the motor vehicle sector, 
independent service providers can only claim access to the data of the 
manufacturers against the payment of a reasonable and proportionate fee 
(Article 7 Regulation No. 715/2007). In contrast, whether such a rule should 
also apply in a case where a patient seeks access to the personal data collected 
by a pharmaceutical company during the course of medication may be 
decided completely differently. In general, it seems less necessary to charge 
the beneficiary of the use of the device for data access than an independent 
service providers for its direct access. On the one hand, the manufacturer will 
already take into account the costs of generating and processing data in the 
                                                 
11 See Art. 6 and 7 Regulation (EC) No. 715/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 June 2007 on type approval of motor vehicles with respect to emissions from light passenger and 
commercial vehicles (Euro 5 and Euro 6) and on access to vehicle repair and maintenance 
information, [2007] OJ L 171/1, as well as Art. 13 Regulation (EC) No. 692/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2008 implementing and amending Regulation No. 
715/2007, [2008] OJ L 199/1. 
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framework of calculating the price for the sale of the device and the provision 
of on-going services directly linked to the device. Hence, the question of a fee 
will mostly relate to the additional costs the manufacturer incurs for enabling 
access. Yet, if legislation on access free-of-charge was adopted, the 
manufacturer could still consider future access costs as potential costs in 
calculating the price for the device. In this regard, it does not matter whether 
the holder of the access right is a direct or only an indirect purchaser. Direct 
purchasers can be expected to pass the surcharge on to any third person who 
may have a right of data access. In any instance, any system of remuneration 
should be based on the idea of FRAND licensing and possibly provide for 
institutional arrangements that reduce the likelihood that the potential for 
disputes about the appropriate royalty rate will reduce the effectiveness of the 
access regime. 
 
25 While to the Institute recommends taking the potential need for sector-
specific legislation into account, the Commission should also work in the 
direction of streamlining regulatory approaches. In this regard, the potential 
right of data access could even be conceived as a generalisation of the right of 
data portability as already contained in Article 20 General Data Protection 
Regulation.12 Indeed, some cases that relate to the collection of personal data 
through devices in which sensors are embedded may already be covered by 
this right. An example would be the monitoring of the body functions of a 
patient during medication through a pharmaceutical company for the purpose 
of preventing hazardous side effects. Such patients will often be in need of 
several drugs and doctors or hospitals will often prefer to prescribe drugs 
from different pharmaceutical companies. Hence, also in this case the 
responsible doctor or hospital will be in need of access to the data of all 
pharmaceutical companies in order to get a reliable and better picture of the 
health of the patient. Whether Article 20 General Data Protection Regulation 
already applies depends on whether in this case the patient ‘has provided’ 
personal data to the pharmaceutical companies. This example highlights the 
particular pro-competitive character of the data portability legislation. Where 
several persons cooperate in the production of data, but only one person is in 
de facto control of the data, the other more access-minded person can be 
vested with the right of data access not only in its own interest but also for the 
purpose of opening up data markets to other economic players as data-service 
providers who may otherwise have difficulties entering the market. Hence, it 
seems that there is enough reason to consider the pros and cons of extending 
the data portability rule of Article 20 General Data Protection Regulation as a 
general regulatory approach beyond cases of use of non-personal data. 
 
                                                 
12 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
[2016] OJ L 119/1. 
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IV.  Legislation on access regimes 
 
26  The Commission seems to believe that legal measures may especially be 
needed as regards access regimes. However, it is not that clear in which cases 
new access regimes are needed and whether the Commission should prefer 
generally applicable access regimes or sector-specific rules. The Institute 
believes that the discussion of different approaches to access regimes should 
be in the focus of the Commission’s work in continuation to its current 
initiative. Indeed, by advocating a discussion on a data access right for the 
beneficiary of the use of sensor-equipped devices, the Institute aims to 
redirect the discussion away from the introduction of new property rights to 
the more important discussion on access. 
 
27 However, there are also huge challenges as regards possible legislation on 
access. Also in this regard, the Institute recommends taking an analytical 
approach. This analysis should first look at the availability of remedies under 
general competition law. In its Position Statement of August 2016, the 
Institute has already argued that mere reliance on competition law will not 
suffice.13 This is also shown in the cases above where the user of a device is 
in need of access to the data. In such cases, the requirement of market 
dominance can turn out to be a first major obstacle to enforcing competition 
law. Furthermore, competition law is not a very viable remedy where public 
sector bodies seek access to privately held data in order to fulfil public tasks. 
In such cases, public sector bodies are not conducting any economic activity 
and therefore cannot be regarded as an undertaking and, hence, as a victim of 
an exclusionary conduct in the sense of Article 102 TFEU. The only way to 
argue a violation of Article 102 TFEU would then be to rely on exploitation. 
Exploitation is, however, rather uncharted land for competition law practice, 
even more so in the case of data markets, where it may be particularly 
difficult to decide what the appropriate price for access should be. 
 
28  As regards access of public sector bodies to data in particular, it is also clear 
that reliance on pure economic efficiency and market failure analysis cannot 
be the only guidepost for legislation. Public-interest grounds are equally 
important. In its consultation the Commission also asks whether stakeholders 
would support access regimes regarding non-personal data in favour of public 
sector bodies based on specific public-interest grounds. Such general, non-
sector specific legislation could indeed be discussed. Still, to answer the 
question of whether access should be free of charge or not or how the royalty 
should be calculated, the concrete public-interest ground may play a key role. 
It seems much easier to justify access to privately held data where public 
                                                 
13 Position Statement of 16 August 2017 (n. 2), para. 32-38. See also the further analysis by Drexl (n. 
8), 44-55 (with an analysis on the European case-law on refusals to license).  
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health is at stake than the interest of the state in promoting urban planning. 
Indeed, general legislation on the access of public sector bodies to privately 
held data would in certain ways constitute the other side of the coin of 
European legislation on public sector information, which, in the form of 
generally applicable legislation and some sector-specific exceptions, promotes 
the access of private businesses for the re-use of publicly held data.14  
 
29  Public-interest grounds could also be imagined as a basis for access of private 
actors to data that is held by other private operators, including competitors. 
The REACH Regulation, which promotes access of producers of hazardous 
chemicals to other firms’ studies on animal testing for the purpose of avoiding 
unnecessary testing, is an example of such access regulation.15 This example 
shows that, as regards access of private entities, cross-sector regulation is not 
readily conceivable, since recognition of public interest as a basis for data 
access is a sector-specific exception rather than a cross-sectorial rule.  
 
30  A most complex field will be cases in which private actors seek access to the 
data of other actors only for the purpose of enhancing their own decision-
making. This is the original domain of competition policy. However, as is 
evidenced by the recommendation of the Institute to consider the introduction 
of a data access right for the beneficiaries of the use of devices in which 
sensors are embedded, access regimes can be conceived provided that these 
regimes are targeted at an identifiable market failure and that they will 
enhance competition.  
 
31 In many instances data-sharing arrangements and platforms, even among 
competitors, will be important for making the data economy work, such as in 
the case of data-sharing platforms of car manufacturers as an infrastructure for 
autonomous driving. As mentioned in the introductory part, however, there is 
also the concern that private entities will share data too much, with potentially 
adverse effects on competition. This problem should primarily be dealt with 
by DG Competition. However, in the framework of the free-flow-of-data 
initiative as well, this risk should always be kept in mind, since any access 
regime that is too far-reaching can later be relied upon by firms as a 
justification for their data-sharing. 
                                                 
14 Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the 
re-use of public sector information, [2003] OJ L 345/90; as amended by Directive 2013/37/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, [2013] OJ L 175/1. 
15 Regulation No. 1907/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 
2006 concerning the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of Chemicals (REACH), 
establishing a European Chemicals Agency, [2006] OJ L 396/1; consolidated version available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02006R1907-
20161011&from=EN (accessed 20 April 2017). 
